Abstract. The authors develop the concept of regional systems of innovation and relate it to preexisting research on national systems of innovation. They argue that work conducted in the 'new regional science' field is complementary to systems of innovation approaches. They seek to link new regional work to evolutionary economics, and argue for the development of evolutionary regional science. Common elements of interest to evolutionary innovation research and new regional science are important in understanding processes of agglomeration, trust building, innovation, institutions, and learning in regional systems. The authors develop analytical frameworks for designating regional systems of innovation in terms of distinction between institutions and organisations, hard and soft infrastructures, and the cultural superstructure. They conclude that an evolutionary approach assists understanding of regional potential for developing systemic innovation.
Introduction
In this paper we explore the case for regional systems of innovation (RSIs). We aim to unify important elements of recent research in what may be termed 'the new regional science' (for example, see Amin and Thrift, 1994; Asheim, 1996; Cooke, 1995; Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Florida, 1995; Gertler, 1995; Grabher, 1993; Herrigel, 1996; Maillat, 1995; Malmberg and Maskell, 1997; Morgan, 1997; Sabel, 1995; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1996; Storper and Scott, 1995) . Although this work contains considerable variety, it also shares numerous complementarities. Amongst the more prominent of these are: a stress upon the recent rise in importance of regions as foci for global economic competitiveness on the part of firms; an emphasis upon the importance of the institutional setting of norms, routines, and conventions concerning the organisational-support infrastructure for regional economic competitiveness; a recognition of informal networks as well as more formal organisations as mechanisms for sustaining high-trust relationships which can be used to minimise transaction costs amongst firms: a reevaluation of the importance of geographical proximity or agglomeration characteristics, for facilitating innovative tacit-knowledge exchange and other externalities; and a recognition of the importance of an institutional and organisational learning propensity to regional economic performance.
This version of a cultural turn in economic geography resonates well with two other strong theoretical and programmatic trends beyond the present confines of regional science. The first concerns the coalescence of neoinstitutional and neo-Schumpeterian economic theory to form a distinctive evolutionary economic theory. Bringing together work from such diverse proponents of neoinstitutionalism as North (1993) and Hodgson (1988) -one with a strong neoclassical economic heritage, the other journeying from Marxism towards evolutionism-and neo-Schumpeterians such as Nelson and Winter (1982) , Freeman (1987) , and Rosenberg (1976)-a new heterodoxy has been established. This is at its strongest and most coherent when deployed as a critique of neoclassical economics. A flavour of the quality of this is supplied in the following quotation:
"If all individual plans, which have been maximised on the basis of market prices, production functions and initial endowments, are mutually compatible in equilibrium as required by definition, then there is, by virtue of simultaneous optimisation under perfect information, no further incentive to deviate from the chosen individual plans.... Important aspects of the changes which can be observed in modern, rapidly altering economies, changes which distinguish them from pre-modern economies, would simply be inaccessible to economic theory. This would, for example, be the case for entrepreneurial activities, technological progress, changing preferences and newly emerging institutions" (Witt, 1991, page 87) . In other words, neoclassical economic theory cannot be used to tackle its central objects of interest.
Of course, the neoclassical school has not taken this lying down. The new neoclassicists such as Lucas (1988) , Romer (1990) and Krugman (1995) have responded with 'new growth theory', ostensibly relaxing most of the assumptions noted above. Thus Lucas developed a model in which the source of endogenous growth is human capital accumulated through learning by doing; Romer has developed a model in which intentional investment in technology is conducted under conditions of imperfect competition and with increasing returns to scale (that is, monopoly); and Krugman has further deployed these relaxed assumptions to develop a model of the growth of agglomeration (mainly cities) in terms of disequilibrium, cumulative causation, and monopoly practices of economic agents. However, as Freeman (1994) notes, these models cannot account for organisational change or the relationships between institutional, technical, and investment change, and to that extent they suffer from the same problems as does old neoclassical growth theory.
One large and very important area of agreement between the new neoclassicists and the evolutionists is that innovation, in the Schumpeterian (1975) sense of product, process, and organisational innovation, accounts for a very large amount, perhaps 80 -90% of the growth in productivity in advanced economies. As productivity growth itself accounts for over 80% of total gross domestic product (GDP) growth in such economies, it is agreed that innovation is unquestionably the major source of economic growth (Solow, 1957) . This helps us understand why the study of innovation processes has become such a rapidly expanding field of intellectual inquiry in recent years. And it is to this field that we turn in this paper to explore, conceptually, the prospects for a synthesis between regional science and innovation studies. Most theoretical work on innovation is neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionist, meaning its focus is on change, not stasis; it is now taken for granted, as a consequence of its own research findings, that innovation is an interactive not a linear process, and it is further founded on a central idea that a key signifier of successful innovation is the extent to which it can be shown to be systemic.
Clearly, evolutionary innovation theory of the kind proposed by Nelson and Winter (1982) , Freeman (1987) , Lundvall (1992) , Nelson (1993) , and Edquist (1997) is potentially highly compatible with new regional science. They are both concerned with the anatomisation of cultural systems as economic processes, or to put it another way both are squarely in the camp of 'social economy' (Sayer and Walker, 1992) . However, as with so much economic research, innovation studies are remarkably spatially unsophisticated, and there is beginning to be a recognition of that fact as one to which attention must be paid (Freeman, 1995; Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 1997) . A key problem is that an uncritically 'national' approach has been taken in developing the talisman concept of 'national innovation systems' (NISs). Given the demands of testing the concept from an interactive, rather than a linear, perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that the main international study, reported by Nelson (1993) , is weak on generalisable findings, whereas the main theoretical study, edited by Lundvall (1992) , is almost entirely lacking in empirical content. Where theoretical and empirical work are well integrated the focus tends to be sectoral, as with Carlsson's (1995) study of factory automation or Jacobsson's (1986) study of computer-controlled machine tools. But Edquist (1997) is sceptical of this sectoral approach because of a lack of clarity in respect of system boundaries regarding generation, diffusion, and utilisation of innovation. Nevertheless, in some ways, the sectoral approach offers a bridge to the regional approach to innovation which, without pretending to operate by means of closed-system assumptions, can, nevertheless, offer a meaningful geographical scale at which sectors or, perhaps, business 'clusters' (Enright, 1996) may be seen to operate, at least in part, systemically.
So, in this paper, we proceed as follows. First we review pertinent elements of the new regional science, paying special attention to its perspectives on institutional, cultural, and organisational learning aspects of regions. Second we review NIS research, drawing out key elements and problems. Third, we focus on the prospects for designating RSIs by reference to aspects of governance and infrastructure. Fourth, is an analysis of aspects of culture of consequence to systemic innovation at the regional level. Variations in capacity, competence, and capability are highlighted in these last two sections.
New regional science: institutional, cultural, and organisational dimensions From the outset we will adopt an important clarification regarding the meaning of the terms 'institutions' and 'organisations' that will assist in the specification of regional processes. This arises from work by Johnson and Gregersen (1995) , subsequently reasserted by Edquist and Johnson (1997) . In both papers it is argued, correctly in our view, that the term 'institution' is used loosely in much intellectual work, not least that arising from innovation research but also in regional research conducted from an institutional perspective. The problem is that the term is deployed to connote both 'institution' and 'organisation'. However, it is fruitful to separate the two: we see the problem very clearly in the following quotation:
"Institutional thickness is a multifaceted concept ... it certainly seems possible to isolate the following factors that contribute towards the construction of institutional thickness. The first and most obvious ... is a plethora of institutions of different kinds (including firms; financial institutions; local chambers of commerce; training agencies ...)" (Amin and Thrift, 1994, page 14) . Although Amin and Thrift go on to include "shared rules, conventions, and ... 'social atmosphere' of particular regions", as well as modes of interest representation and consensus as institutional factors, we prefer to designate those cited in the longer quotation as 'organisations'.
We do this because institutions and organisations play different roles; the first are more like rules of the game, and the second more like the teams that play the game according to distinctive styles and with different competencies and capabilities. Organisations are embedded in institutions. Thus norms, rules, routines, conventions, and standards, such as, say, legal institutions, are the setting for the practices of courts, juries, legal teams, the police, and so on. Of course this is a systemic relationship in which organisations impact back upon institutions. This is an essential point from an evolutionary perspective, as it helps our understanding of how processes of change occur. Rules change as the practices of actors interact with them, and practices change with the introduction of rule changes. These are, in themselves, creative or innovative processes. An even finer distinction is suggested by Hodgson (1993) who differentiates institutions based on authority which he calls organisations, from those that are not, such as language. But this does not help us proceed very much and harks back to distinctions made between 'hard' and 'soft' institutions which were prevalent in earlier innovation theory (Johnson and Gregersen, 1995, page 12) . We think that keeping the two analytically separate helps in three ways: it is terminologically exact; it encourages more precise differentiation between different kinds of institutions and organisations; and it facilitates analysis of the specific functions of any particular category of either. Thus Edquist and Johnson (1997) , for example, contemplate a threefold categorisation of institutional functions: those which supply information, thus reducing uncertainty (for example, intellectual property rights); those that regulate conflict and cooperation (for example, arbitration tribunals); and those that provide incentives (for example, career-promotion arrangements).
This distinction between institutions and organisations may help us to resolve a difficulty which many have with the vagueness of a concept such as 'milieu' (Maillat, 1995; . According to Maillat: "The concept of milieu is based on the role played by the territorial context and its ability to valorise the players' proximity in a specific way in relation to the external environment ... 'the milieu is a collective operator which reduces the static and dynamic degree of uncertainty facing firms by tacitly and explicitly organising the functional interdependency of local players ...' (Camagni, 1991) . ... From this perspective, the milieu may be considered as an efficient management structure that is an alternative to the market and hierarchy, and that allows transaction costs to be cut and specific information to be verified" (Maillat, 1995, pages 159 -160) . On the whole this looks very much like a (regionalised) institutional, rather than organisational, set up. It facilitates cooperation, tacitly organises interaction, cuts transaction costs, and reduces uncertainty. It thus meets all the functional criteria of an institutional setting of norms, rules, routines, and conventions discussed thus far.
But, like others, Maillat goes further and includes in the milieu organisations such as firms, training institutes, governance structures, and so on. We would prefer to think of these as organisations embedded in and interacting with the milieu, itself cognate with Marshall's (1919) notion of 'industrial atmosphere'. This is mainly because it is possible to envisage organisations such as those mentioned in the absence of milieu of the kind Maillat describes, but it is much harder to conceive of the milieu, in the sense of 'institutional setting', in the absence of organisations. It must be presumed that fundamentally this is Maillat's point, as milieux are not ubiquitous: rather they are special cases. Moreover, they are regional, or even local, cases of externalised systemic institutionalised interaction.
With respect to the question of transaction costs, both Williamson (1985) and North (1993) devote great attention to their economic impact. North even estimated their share of US GDP to have been approximately 45% in 1970, a figure likely to have been exceeded since. They do this from a basic neoclassical position in which, as Granovetter (1985, page 503) puts it, "whatever organization form is most efficient will be the one observed", that is, what history has yielded up is the efficient solution to some economic problem-a conservative version of the evolutionary concept of natural selection. Nevertheless, Williamson and North clearly point to something of moment, and could be said to share a perception that transaction costs ought to be minimised. Williamson sees internalisation through firms or externalisation through markets as being the main ways to achieve this, though he has responded to critics like Powell (1990) by saying that he might have underestimated the role of networks as a third way between state and market, whereas North places a higher valuation on trust, conventions, and the like in support of markets as the way forward.
The focus on transaction costs in a regional setting is shared by Storper and Scott (1995) . They write of transactions in general involving "transmission and exchange of information, goods, persons and labour" (page 506), and their key spatial insight is that the more complex, irregular, uncertain, unpredictable, and uncodifiable these are, the more likely they are to be geographically concentrated. On the face of it, this works with peculiar force with respect to innovation. Thus Breschi and Malerba (1997) note that "innovators are geographically concentrated when there are conditions of high opportunity, high appropriability and high firm cumulativeness" (page 141). This means situations where exploitation prospects are high, intellectual property rights are highly sensitive, and leaders are highly attuned to preventing breaches of trust. In other words, conditions of high spatial monopoly, increasing returns of scale, and highly imperfect information for all but those in the know. Transaction costs for outsiders are enormous in such situations. But, for Breschi and Malerba, they decline in situations of high opportunity with low appropriability and low firm cumulativeness. Yet for them, this also means that geographical concentration is as low in such circumstances as it is where the knowledge base is simple and codified. In other words, the keys to geographical clustering are high appropriability (confidentiality and protection thereof) and high cumulativeness (technological lead). Nevertheless, crucially, in their test of this hypothesis they find:
"quite remarkable differences across countries, particularly with respect to the geographical distribution of innovators. This is clearly the result of the working of different 'national systems of innovation'. ... These results thus confirm, once again, that the specific history of industrial development of each country, the role played by institutions and public agents, and the specific competences accumulated by firms strongly interact with technology specific factors in affecting the organization and evolution of innovative activities within a given industry" (pages 150 -151). Thus Germany and the United Kingdom show very high levels of spatial dispersion of innovators, whereas France and Italy show higher degrees of spatial concentration across traditional, intermediate, and high-technology industrial sectors.
Why would the same industry produce geographical clustering of innovators in one country and dispersion in another? What institutional factors might influence the organisation of innovation differentially? Why, for the same industry, might transaction costs be higher in one country than in another? Economies of scale will be one key variable: Germany and the United Kingdom possess more large multinational companies across more sectors than do France and Italy. Such companies are certainly more geographically dispersed in Germany, and may be in the United Kingdom than in either France or Italy, where Paris and Milan -Turin are predominant centres of industry. Research expenditure is more biased towards the private sector in Germany and the United Kingdom, more towards the state in France and Italy. This echoes our former point, but also leads to the possible deduction that the effects of research expenditure are more appropriable in some geographical locations. Contrariwise, research and development (R&D) expenditure is not the same as innovation: the first being an input measure, and the second signifying outputs of innovation processes which may not be R&D dependent. Third, patenting activity is historically higher in Germany and the United Kingdom as are bibliometric measures (scientific papers produced and cited), suggesting that there is both higher and wider cumulativeness and appropriability, and thus dispersion (Archibugi and Pianta, 1992; Nelson, 1993) .
We must be very careful with such interpretations, however, pitched as they are at the NIS level and having a strong tendency toward the use of official statistics which have far more to do with the formal R&D and invention aspects of knowledge generation than the more informal processes of innovation which, as we have noted, need not be associated with R&D expenditure or, we would add, patenting activity. At the regional level, innovation capacity, broadly defined, may or may not be closely associated with high levels of R&D, patenting, and the presence of large multinationals. Other, less formal, elements such as learning capacity, networking competence, and methods of reducing transaction costs by means of nonmonetary exchange or "untraded interdependencies", as Dosi (1988) and Storper (1995) refer to them (see also, Asheim, 1996) , may be more fundamentally important.
But, equally, we must be wary of the 'territorial logic' approach to understanding the nature of regionally differentiated productive clusters. Clustering or agglomeration in space does not necessarily give rise to lower transaction costs, for reasons advanced by Malmberg and Maskell (1997) . Institutional factors may again, intervene. Arguing that agglomerations offer advantage for tacit-knowledge exchange and that proximity allows firms to limit uncertainty by developing localised routines and procedures along certain 'learning trajectories', they also raise the interesting point that imitation can be blocked in such settings, thus reinforcing the competitive strength of the leading firms in agglomerations. As knowledge becomes institutionally embedded, a stock of assets is accumulated at a level not available to outsiders. Communication of such knowledge depends on long-established trust relationships and competences amongst firms such that they routinely exchange information of consequence to innovation. Malmberg and Maskell then conclude that this is not only a feature of small-firm industrial districts but also of situations in which interactive learning involves multinational companies.
We think that this may be open to question, and to develop our argument we would wish to compare situations of regional embeddedness, based on trustful exchange, with those of regional disembeddedness, where relations are more market focused, even though both might display characteristics of regional agglomeration. We would argue rather strongly, for example, that automotive-industry clusters, at least in Western Europe and North America, are inclined to be disembedded agglomerations. Exchange is largely at arm's length, extremely competitive, and often based on the 'sweating' of suppliers who are typically put in a rivalrous low-trust relationship with one another in consequence of the market power exerted by large customers. Although we would not wish to equate all such agglomerations to a single all-pervasive logic, we nevertheless think that, the impact of NISs notwithstanding, where large and small firms interact in proximity-the automotive industry being paradigmatic-embeddedness of the kind described for small-firm clusters is outweighed by disembeddedness, based on arm'slength exchange, in the main.
American automotive industry agglomeration practices are likely to be an extreme case where, as Helper (1991) presents it, suppliers still fill orders dictated by customers with little discretion granted by the customers over matters of design or innovation. As Robertson and Langlois (1995) comment:
"The transaction costs of maintaining impersonal market relationships may be great, however, as the willingness of US core firms to switch suppliers engenders little loyalty from the latter, who therefore stick to the letter of contracts and are reluctant to offer help when they are able. In any case, given the centralised nature of decision-making, there is only a slim chance that suggestions emanating from suppliers, including internal captive suppliers, would attract any attention at the core" (page 555). It can be said that this is clearly not a case in which interactive learning is taking place; as such it offers a clear frontier, in conceptual and practical terms, between agglomerations that are regionally embedded and those that are disembedded. But we would go further, citing also the case of Japanese automotive industry core networkswidely perceived to be tightly networked, trustful, and supportive of supplier-initiated innovation-in which a large part of such apparently strong regional embeddedness lies in the fact that core firms often own a large share in the equity capital of their suppliers. In consequence, they have a definite interest in ensuring good economic performance by such suppliers.
Hence there is a spectrum of agglomeration types, ranging from those that are horizontally structured, consisting entirely of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that interact according to norms of reciprocity, high trust, and intense interactive learning and are capable of being defined in terms of high regional embeddedness, to those that are vertically structured with the opposite attributes, verging on, or falling squarely within, a category of regional disembeddedness. This sketch has been drawn from the automotive industry, but we are willing to extend it to other situations in which regional agglomerations are dominated by large firms. Again, it is important not to fall into the trap of binary thinking, as there are instances of 'comakership' and 'partnership sourcing' even in certain automotive-industry agglomerations-that of Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany being a case in point (Cooke and Morgan, 1994; 1998) . But what has to be accepted regarding vertically structured regional agglomeration of either the US or Japanese kind, is that innovation benefits accrue to the core firm in the first instance, and supplier networks exist primarily to secure this competitive advantage.
Hence the landscape described in the new regional science is complex and diverse. Institutional factors operating at different spatial scales and differentially amongst industry sectors have to be taken into account as significant shapers of the constraintand-opportunity calculus that operates in specific territorial milieux. Organisations responsible for practices in such settings will vary the extent of cooperation and competition depending upon past experience, the strength or weakness of ties with other organisations, and the horizontal or vertical nature of the main vectors of power operating within regional agglomerations. Embeddedness is not a ubiquitous characteristic of agglomerations if we adhere to the anthropological meaning of the concept-as a culture characterised by cooperative norms of reciprocity and exchange, to be contrasted with situations of arm's-length market-type exchange (disembeddedness). But even if we relax that, perhaps overrestrictive, definition to allow institutional contexts in which cooperative practices are important elements in competitive advantage, there remain major variations amongst agglomerations over space and over time to be explored and described. Thus, when 'learning regions' are contrasted unfavourably with mass-production regions (Florida, 1995) this may be to overlook potentially important variations and evolutionary changes in mass-production regions. To some extent such nuances have begun to be specified, at least conceptually (Scott, 1996) , but the quest for the territorial logic of regional agglomeration needs to be accompanied by sensitivity to certain 'institutional illogics', often rooted in the distinctive and divergent path dependencies through which regional economies have evolved. Whether the NIS approach to anatomising such complexities is helpful is something to which we turn in the next section.
National innovation systems: concepts and consequences
Whereas the new regional science is more concerned explicitly with new regionalised forms of economic coordination, and only implicitly directed at the study of innovation processes, in the NIS approach the study of innovation processes is taken as the starting point. The three elements of the term tend to be used more or less unreflectively, especially the first. For NIS researchers 'national' equals 'state' or 'nation-state': the sovereign body responsible for territorial governance. 'Innovation' is conceived to be the interactive process by means of which new knowledge is transformed into commercial or other practical uses. This is in contrast with an earlier concept of innovation as a linear process whereby science pushed innovation into the market or, maybe, demand pulled it, but in terms dictated by scientists and technologists. The new approach allows for users to be far more influential, and for other intermediary actors to have a heightened innovatory role. The term 'system' is deployed less reflectively than is innovation, but more so than is nation. Lundvall (1992) , who also notes that states such as Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland are multinational, sees a system as consisting of a number of elements with relationships among them, and an innovation system as those "elements and relationships that interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge" (page 2). The system in question is a social system, a central activity of which involves learning. As learning is an interactive process, the system in question is also dynamic. In addition, NISs are open and heterogeneous systems. Lundvall is quite open to the notion that RSIs may exist, but believes that institutional factors mean that NISs remain important in supporting and directing innovation processes despite the possible effects of globalisation and regionalisation upon them.
For Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) NISs are, in fact, national systems of technical innovation, and national also means sovereign states such as Japan and the USA, as well as Korea and Taiwan which are, as specified, neither. They adhere to the interactive definition of innovation "to encompass the processes by which firms master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are new to them, if not to the universe or even to the nation" (page 4). Thus their definition is both narrower (technical innovation in firms) and weaker (innovation new only to the firm, not to the market) than LundvalPs. This is also true of the systems concept which is "a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance ... of national firms" and, later, "a set of institutional actors that, together, plays the major role in influencing innovative performance" (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993, pages 4 -5) . Hence, although a number of ambiguities pertain to the scope of the concept, and bearing in mind our caveats about terms such as nation and institutions, we would say that a core definition of NISs probably need not evolve too far from that offered by the first to publish the term- Freeman (1987) .
Where Freeman presented the NIS as "the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies" (1987, page 1), we would only offer the following modest adjustments to his definition of an NIS as:
"the network of public and private organisations and institutions in a sovereign state whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies and organisational models". Here, the continuation of Freeman's use of the word network is justified by the notion of systemic interaction it implies, along with the sense that no innovation user, intermediary, or producer of consequence can survive without at least some networking capability. The addition of the term 'organisations' and 'sovereign states' needs no further elaboration, and that of 'organisational models' broadens the focus of attention beyond technologies per se. That the 'organisational models' dimension of innovation warrants inclusion is testified to by the pervasive attempts of Western firms to capture the success of Japanese industrial organisation, through adaptations such as 'lean production' or deformations like 'downsizing', 'delayering', and 'reengineering' during the 1990s. Of course, Japanese firms borrowed considerably from the West, both in Japan's earliest period of industrialisation in the 19th century and post-1945, as the status there of quality expert Edwards Deming testifies.
In a summary of the state of the art regarding the NIS approach Edquist (1997) points to a number of key features: (1) Innovation and learning are the central processes under investigation, and knowledge transfer among formal R&D, educational, and economic organisations is the focus.
(2) A systems perspective is adopted to explore the political economy of innovation as comprehensively as possible, though research often, of necessity, relates to particular NIS subsystems. (3) Historical processes associated with path dependence and divergent outcomes are included, as are structure -agency perspectives. (4) In the NIS approach the importance of identifying difference rather than abstracting from it is stressed. (5) The interactive practices of organisations and institutions in terms of reciprocity and feedback are highlighted. (6) Innovation is defined in terms of the development of new or better products, processes, and organisational models. (7) Institutions in the sense of norms, habits, rules, routines, and conventions and the ways these evolve are key elements of study. (8) Conceptual diffuseness is allowed so that, at this early stage in the research agenda, possibly fruitful perspectives are not prematurely excluded, allowing selection to occur by degrees. (9) The present aim of NIS research is to develop appreciative rather than formal theory by elaborating conceptual frameworks of systemic innovation as guides for further research. Despite the last two points, the NIS project involves ironing out conceptual diversity over time, seeking to relate NIS work primarily to evolutionary economic theory and explaining the dynamics of processes of innovation.
To give a flavour of the stylised narratives that are capable of being drawn from one particular NIS expert's approach to analysing innovation systems, at state and suprastate levels, with a view to understanding significant variations in economic performance, selected findings by Freeman (1995) are summarised in tables 1 and 2. From the comparison of Japanese and Soviet economic-performance indicators Freeman concludes that, despite the USSR's massive defence and space investment of some 3% of total GNP, performance could have been far better if social, technical, and economic linkages had been more systemic and if incentives to efficient performance had been better. For example, the need to meet planned production targets acted as negative incentives to innovation, in addition to which user -producer linkages were virtually nonexistent. Freeman adds that, in some respects, the two countries resembled each other: both had good science-based education systems and the capacity to plan for scientific and technological development. But whereas Japanese foresight was interactive, involving government agencies, industry, and universities, Soviet science and technology planning was more exclusive and under the hegemony of the military and space interests. The two countries, in other words, demonstrate the extremes of embeddedness and disembeddedness in organisational and institutional terms.
Freeman's second contrast takes the form of stylised comparisons of the newly industrialising countries of East Asia and Latin America in the 1980s (table 2). Freeman assigns a large role in the divergence in economic performance during the 1980s to financial and cultural innovations, effected by more radical social changes such as land reform and universal education in East Asia, which produced structural and technical transformation, not least by creating an entrepreneurial class with access to capital to invest in innovation. At precisely the same time, Latin America was starved of capital because of the vastly increased interest rates exacted on loans taken out prior to the Reagan era when the conquest of inflation became an economic priority in the USA and elsewhere in the advanced economies. Nevertheless, the consistent theme running through these accounts is the importance to economic performance of systemic linkage between developing public innovation and educational investment, knowledge transfer, innovation expenditure by firms, and rapid learning from involvement in export markets. The roles of finance and an interactive cultural disposition, set in a context where there are clear incentives, are bedrock features of successful innovation systems. In this paper we explore these dimensions in more depth, and in relation to the question of RSIs. We will look both at the financial and at the cultural dimensions as they interact with policies and, particularly, policy capacities, competences, and capabilities with respect to regional innovation. As it has been expressed at NIS level, policy "ranges from taxes, direct subsidies, public education and training facilities, public R&D institutions, infrastructure facilities, financial support, regulation, standards, to public procurement" (Gregersen, 1992, page 144) . Whereas Gregersen sees what are traditionally domestic policy capacities such as these possibly being constrained, if not usurped by transnational political regulation, we will explore the extent to which some may also be within the competence of regional authorities, and what the implications of this are for supporting and sustaining regional innovation systems.
Towards regional systems of innovation: financial, infrastructural, and cultural issues
We wish first to make ourselves clear about what we mean when we talk about regions. This is intrinsically important, but it has extra importance as we now wish to move the discussion up a gear from our review above of the new regional science literature. There, by and large, theory and concept formation are used to tackle the difficult but rewarding question of how embeddedness works, for example in relation to transaction costs, in agglomerations or even clusters in the sense of Porter (1990) or Enright (1996) . These are studies of organisational and institutional interactions in contexts of, essentially, economic and geographic proximity. Here, we wish to consider the organisational and institutional dimensions of policy competence and capability in relation to what Putnam (1993) refers to as the 'social capital' of a region. That is, the social infrastructure of solidarity, civic engagement, reciprocity, and trustfulness that is the basis for collective action in many dimensions, including the formal policy dimension.
In this respect a region must be defined in terms of both its administrative and its cultural evolution. We do not, contra Williamson (1985) , wish to interpret what exists as an optimal solution to a problem of economic efficiency, but rather as the result of a combination of processes that have given a region a particular specificity along an evolutionary trajectory. We would set out a number of broad criteria to begin with. First, rather as with states, we would not advocate setting any size limit, such as population, to the designation. Second, the designation should, nevertheless, display homogeneity and identity with respect to certain limited criteria. Third, the designation should enable the region to be distinguishable from other regions by reason of certain kinds of specificity. Fourth, it should display some features of internal integration and cohesion, for example in administrative terms. Thus a region is a territory less than its sovereign state, possessing distinctive supralocal administrative, cultural, political, or economic power and cohesiveness, differentiating it from its state and other regions. And here the evolutionary-process dimension becomes useful for, as Hadjimichalis (1986) , Harvie (1994) , and, recently, Keating (1997) have pointed out, there are two key processes by means of which regions evolve. One of these is through a process of regionalisation, where the supralocal territory in question is delimited by a state or some other superordinate body. This devolves certain administrative powers to organisations such as parliaments and administrative offices, that interact with preexisting institutional conventions. They may introduce new rules of the game, or seek to generate these where, in regional terms, they had not previously existed. In this context, the regionalisation process can precede the existence of regional cohesiveness and even regional identity of a sociocultural kind. The other evolutionary process is regionalism, where the reverse is the case. Here, social capital may already be quite strong because of cultural or, perhaps, economic cohesiveness and identity, but power to activate social capital and realise the capabilities of regional interests is denied by a refusal on the part of the superordinate authority to grant appropriate competences. This may lead to strong political demands from below in the face of obduracy or perceived neglect which, if successful, result in the establishment of regional organisations-adminstrative or political or both-which find a preexisting regional-institutional milieu with which to interact.
Regionalisation involves the imposition of organisations in order to stimulate the development of regional institutions; regionalism involves the realisation of regional organisations to give active expression to regional institutions. This distinction is important as it may help us to understand why some economically less-favoured regions may, nevertheless, display better systemic innovation capacity where they can mobilise inherited social capital, than do others. In an interesting article on 'experimental regionalism', Sabel (1995) fails to see the difference, and uses the terms interchangeably in advocating widespread regionalisation by states to encourage innovation. Clearly, some regions will be significantly advantaged over others in terms of their preexisting 'collective social order' as Scott (1997) refers to it. Such an order may either be inimical to interactive innovation or susceptible to it, depending on whether what Ostrom (1992) calls the 'microconstitutional regulation' within the order is more or less disposed to cooperation, trustful relationships, and interactive learning. In other words, in terms of its degrees of embeddedness and disembeddedness.
Having made this point, though, one of the more unexpected developments of modern times has been the emergence of 'bourgeois regionalism' (Harvie, 1994) which has, to some extent, supplanted the older processes of cultural regionalism intellectually. Bourgeois regionalism is the phenomenon whereby, on occasion regionalised entities, like Baden-Wurttemberg or Rhone-Alpes, become regionalist in their demands for even greater autonomy to forge ahead with innovation policies, against what are perceived to be recalcitrant sovereign-state administrations. This coincided with a big push in the 1990s, especially from the German Lander, to gain more comprehensive representation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union, and to establish a powerful European Union (EU) Regional Council, possibly, in time, as the second chamber of the European parliament. As part of this, regional alliances such as the 'Four Motors for Europe' were forged to promote innovation among leading European Union regions. However, this enthusiasm for a Europe of the regions has waned somewhat in the light of setbacks to ambitions in these directions (Jeffery, 1996) .
We conclude here, therefore, that although a stronger capacity for the exertion of social capital by regionalist entities might be hypothesised because of the presence of a preexisting cultural base, this need not always carry through into systemic innovation practice, as regional evolution, path dependencies, and trajectory 'lock-ins' (Grabher, 1993) render outcomes indeterminate. Equally, even artificial regions can display regionalism where their economic, administrative, and political power brings them into perceived conflict with their sovereign state. We suggest the key to strong RSI capacity lies in some organisational and institutional combination of the foregoing attributes, but we are presently unclear which particular combination unlocks which door at which time.
Finance and regional systems of innovation We will examine in detail three aspects of regional financial competence and capability: the financial sector and banks; regional public budgets; and finance for infrastructure. We will then present two stylised profiles in relation to a range of indicators: one typifying a high competence or capability region such as the Basque Country, Flanders, or postdevolution Scotland, where regionalism is pronounced. German and Austrian Lander, though regionalised, according to our analysis occupy a position closer to these characteristics than those of the other profile, one of regionalised entities on the French and Italian model, and many Spanish regions that have yet to call down the competences constitutionally available to the Basque Country or Catalonia.
As has been suggested, finance is a matter of strategic importance, but institutional rules of the game vary nationally, and the financial habits of firms may also vary regionally. Firms may habitually access external finance, especially for innovation, in some national or regional contexts, whereas those elsewhere may invest mostly from retained profits or even from relatively informal sources based on private collateral. At the national level, Zysman (1983) identifies three types of financial system: (a) a marketoriented system in which funds are allocated through a developed capital market; (b) a credit-based system institutionally regulated and closely controlled by the government; and (c) a credit-based system with relatively little regulation and control. In the absence of regional stock exchanges, the first system is the least regionalisable and is relatively poorly accessible given the priority which central exchanges give to national and international interests. In the other two cases, however, and depending on the degree of financial jurisdiction within a regional government's competence, credit-based finance is capable of regionalisation. For innovation financing, which is notoriously perceived to be very high risk by most financial institutions, security or active participation in ad hoc cases or through an innovation-growth fund will probably be necessary.
Lender -borrower interaction and open communication are argued to be increasingly important features in modern theories of finance. This is a primary means of potentially overcoming the funding gap that a majority of innovative companies regularly report as a barrier to innovation, especially smaller companies (for example see Dodgson and Rothwell, 1993; Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991; Tang et al, 1996) . Uncertainty in the time scale of investment realisation is a principal reason for risk aversity by banks, and even venture-capital companies, towards innovation-at least in Europe. Thus, a task for regional governance is the facilitation of interaction between parties by building up competence, reputation, trust, and reliability and helping to reduce uncertainties and wasted transaction costs. The tacit-knowledge exchange necessary to these processes makes it imperative that relatively autonomous financial and administrative organisations communicate in ways that minimise the constraints imposed by codified rules emanating from a distant head office.
Regional budgets Clearly, the capacity of regional industry to mobilise its innovative capability may be significantly assisted where there is also budgetary competence and capability on the part of regional government. Capability to vary the scale and scope of budgets available can be crucial to supporting innovation, especially among SMEs. Fixed budgets allocated in block form with earmarked headings make this far more difficult. For example, in the Italian system, where there are two kinds of regions-the special statute regions (such as Sicily and Sardinia) and the ordinary statute regions (such as Tuscany or Veneto)-the earmarked-expenditure patterns are as shown in table 3 (see over).
In the case of the ordinary regions, although their own tax revenues comprise 49% of total current revenues (of which health revenues alone are 41%), there is a degree of fiscal autonomy in that regions now raise more in taxation than they used to, but little spending autonomy as the bulk of receipts are health-service contributions which must be spent on health care (Desideri and Santantonio, 1996) . To that extent, the relative success with which a regional government such as Emilia-Romagna has been able to develop valued enterprise-support infrastructures for SME innovation is all the more remarkable, but so too are the barriers to growth and change in the nature of that support (Cooke, 1996) . If we classify regional budgetary situations according to a threefold typology, the Italian, French, and most Spanish regions would conform to a category of decentralised spending in which a central administration has decentralised expenditure for reasons of economic efficiency or political expediency. In such circumstances regions clearly have little autonomy to develop innovation systems other than at the margin of preexisting economic activity. Of course embeddedness, in reducing transaction costs, especially in small-firm industrial-district settings, can enable more to be done with less. A second kind of regional budgetary capacity can be called autonomous spending, and this is found where regional government has the competence to design its own spending policies. In this case it may develop the capability to establish specific innovation programmes to subsidise R&D capability among SMEs, or may tailor education to enhance those skills in demand from large or small firms in the region. Belgian regions have a dominant shared competence with the federal government for industry, research, and innovation spending and exclusive competences for culture, education, tourism, and land-use planning. In these competences they also have the right of shared or exclusive representation of the Belgian state in the Council of Ministers of the European Union (Kerremans and Beyers, 1996) .
The third category of regional budgetary capacity is where regions possess taxation authority. In these circumstances regions have, in principle, the greatest opportunities to deploy regional budgets in support of autonomous policies-innovation being amongst these. As well as calling upon public spending allocations, they can use the fiscal system to raise extra finance as and when necessary. The Basque Country has been in a position to do this from the outset of its status as an autonomous region within the Spanish state system. It has been able to support a strong and well-established programme of SME-innovation support through funding of SME innovation and through sustaining a number of successful technology centres dedicated to research and technology transfer in specific fields such as microelectronics, new materials, machine tools, and software development.
Infrastructural financing Infrastructure, in the sense of hard networks of telecommunications and transportation systems, is of key importance to the developmental potential of a given territory. Smith (1997) quotes evidence that high infrastructure investment is associated, cross-nationally, with high productivity growth. Moreover, such facilities have, historically, tended to be provided by public or quasi-public investment, primarily because of scale, indivisibility, multiple use, and the generic functions to which they are put. Infrastructure is overwhelmingly composed of collective goods, and both its provision and its pricing have major effects upon economic performance and technological choice, not least with respect to regional advantage. There is also, argues Smith, a softer network of knowledge infrastructure which has a heavy public expenditure component attached to it, though less exclusively so than with hard networks. Foremost here are government research institutes, universities, vocational-training organisations, standards-setting bodies, patenting organisations, and technology-transfer and innovation-support networks. Both hard and soft infrastructures can be important in giving cohesion to regional economies.
However, most regions have insufficient budgetary capacity to construct hard infrastructures of the kind they would like, and many elements of soft infrastructure, such as the establishment of universities, are also beyond them (except for example, as in the German case where the Lander have that competence, albeit shared with the federal government in terms of basic capital outlays). Thus it is important to know the degrees of influence which regional bodies can bring to bear on superordinate authorities with respect to infrastructure investment, not least because of their importance to the configuration of systemic interaction and regional innovation capability. These degrees of influence may be categorised as follows: (1) The situation where regions have no control over construction or management of infrastructures, for example major international airports.
(2) The situation where regions have some influence in construction and management of infrastructures, for example local telecommunication networks. (3) The category in which regions share costs of infrastructure provision, for example, regional science and technology parks. (4) The category in which regions have responsibility for infrastructure provision, for example, technology centres.
The key issue at hand is the extent to which influence can be brought to bear such that the region's infrastructural configuration matches as nearly as possible the identified needs for developing a regional innovation system. The more these collective decisions can be tailored in this way, the better both hard and soft networks should work. In table 4 we summarise the aforementioned financial-framework competences in terms of stronger and weaker RSI potential. Thus, the more a region approximates to the left-hand column the more favourable are the financial and infrastructural conditions for developing an RSI. Between the left-hand and right-hand columns, regions can be graded into those closer or further away from either pole. However, these merely list conditions-they do not say anything about their appropriation. We turn to that question in the next section. 
Regional innovation systems as externalised learning organisations
Our presentation of key indicators of organisational and infrastructural capacity, competence, and capability in regions with strong systemic innovation potential, above, was prefaced by the observation that these are poles on a continuum rather than binary absolutes. Our argument is that regions in which systemic innovation is recognised as a key feature of improved economic performance may evolve towards the stronger (left-hand) pole. This is a complex process involving institutional and organisational evolution, and the pace and direction of change are uncertain. Nevertheless, it is important at this point to explore some of the main process elements that evolutionary theory refers to as these relate to our specific interest in capturing processes of regional evolution. There are, as has been noted, significant compatibilities between the concepts of interest to the new regional science and evolutionary economic theory applied to innovation, and we will comment on five of these.
First, for evolutionists, the matters of interest are processes of change. These processes are conceived to be determinate in that they are fundamentally driven by disequilibrium conditions in markets, initial endowments, and the institutional and organisational configurations of economies. Moreover, the processes in question are cumulative but do not evolve along equivalent trajectories: outcomes are uncertain but are influenced by the configuration of the political economy in the past. History matters to the evolution of processes, and history is inscribed in economic geography. Myrdal's (1957) use of the concept 'cumulative causation' is profoundly evolutionary; the concept was first coined by Veblen (1919) , a founding father of the institutional strand of evolutionary economics. Thus, in modern parlance, evolutionary change is path dependent (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985) . Path dependence is associated with various notions of 'lock-in' (Grabher, 1993) . Regional economies are particularly suited to study in terms of lock-in, especially where reconversion from older to newer industries is in progress, but also where restructuring occurs within path-dependent sectors. The processes whereby at the institutional level cognition of the need for change interacts functionally with the organisational level and, in turn, feeds into or feeds back from the policy level to avoid or accommodate lock-in, are issues of central importance to the understanding of regional evolution.
Second, and not least owing to the Schumpeterian evolutionary perspective that also influenced Perroux, evolutionists are exercised by the role of externalities and other aspects of agglomeration economies under conditions where individuals and organisations have imperfect knowledge of the processes leading to change and of their possible implications. Schumpeter's approach is especially fruitful in assisting understanding of the pervasive effects of radical innovation where these lead to a 'swarming' effect attracting, cluster-like, would-be imitators, adaptors, and incremental innovators, thereby triggering growth dynamics but also 'creative destruction'. It has been pointed out that this thinking was highly influential on Dahmen's (1988) theory of 'development blocks', or industry-focused linkage structures which, together with Schumpeter's thinking on innovation, contributed to Porter's conception of industry clusters (1990, page 790) .
Third, innovation processes are, as we have already noted, matters of central interest to evolutionary economists, not least because they are so important to understanding processes of economic change which contribute such a significant amount to GDP growth in advanced economies. We have reviewed the rationales for this previously, but it is also true to say that regional science has contributed substantially to the spatial analysis of innovation for many years, albeit under the guise of studying technological change, high-technology change, high-technology clustering, and technology-policy processes (see, for example Hall and Markusen, 1985; Malecki, 1991; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1993) .
Fourth, evolutionists are particularly interested in institutions as norms, rules, conventions, and routines which comprise the 'glue' linking the organisational 'pieces', notably in systems of innovation (Lipparini and Sobrero, 1994) . These are of special interest where they are hypothesised to shape incentive and opportunity structures, but also where they involve decision processes which privilege cooperation over competition and have effects upon transaction costs. The conditions under which high-trust relationships form, the reputational networks that embed these institutionally, and the economic efficiencies that arise from collaborative rather than rivalrous behaviour, are all matters of moment here. These also link back, with spatial importance, to regional science concerns with disequilibrium, agglomeration, and innovation processes.
Fifth, there is a shared interest in understanding and accounting for processes of institutional and organisational learning. This is not least because in a society in which knowledge is a key resource, learning how to generate, process, diffuse, and access it is a fundamental socioeconomic imperative. Interactions amongst users and producers, inventors and innovators, and different kinds of organisations for whom synergies may be anticipated, are significant means through which learning gains may be appropriated. Lundvall and Johnson (1994) have written at length about the lineaments of the 'learning economy' in which externalisation, specialisation and knowledge intensification cause successful firms not only to engage in learning by doing, using, or interacting, but also to learn how to learn. Monitoring, mentoring, and movement of personnel between organisations are all characteristic of successful learning organisations, but increasingly such practices are in demand in the external environment of firms and other organisations in learning economies. The interest of new regional science has been stimulated to examine learning regions (Asheim, 1996; Florida, 1995; Morgan, 1997) to ascertain the specific role of regional institutions and organisations in processes such as these.
Hence, in a comparable manner to that which we outlined for productive regional infrastructure, we also wish to conduct an equivalent exercise for the superstructural nexus of productive regional culture. As Sweeney (1995) has observed, a 'culture of co-operation' is necessarily more highly valued in a context where innovation is conceived as institutionally interactive and learning influenced. Thus openness, willingness to learn, and the sharing of information are now seen as characteristics distinguishing progressive from nonprogressive firms and other organisations. The form is well captured in the following quotation:
"The munificent environment which this form of interactive organization develops is nurtured and controlled by the culture of the locality. Culture is in essence the value system which is shared by members of a local or regional area. It is the distinctive characteristics of the patterns of information processing of a community located in a particular place" (Itami, 1989, page 134 ). This, we feel, is the kind of associative disposition that differentiates the region with strong systemic-innovation potential from those with lesser potential. Most regions probably do not display such characteristics of openness and willingness to share valued information in the economic relations among firms, though more may in other spheres-notably that of social or community relations. But, to a greater or lesser extent, regions must evolve towards associative disposition if they are to sustain innovation, and evidence is emerging to suggest that, in different ways and at different speeds, many are beginning to (Braczyk et al, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998) .
At the level of policy organisation, such associationism necessarily involves greater inclusivity in terms of the representation of interests of consequence to the policy matter in hand, for example, on regional innovation policy, relevant public and private representatives from outside the immediately responsible administration. There should be some willingness on the part of policy administrations to let go competences that can be better discharged by other, possibly nonpublic, agencies. Policymaking should be configured to learn through policy networks which are institutionally embedded but not fixed, yet capable of taking initiatives to meet evolutionary challenges. HanssenBauer and Snow (1996) describe just such a network in a region of Norway where a multifirm network was purposely formed to help member companies learn how to develop and apply knowledge about management and organisational change and to enhance regional competitiveness. It was initiated and funded by firms but supported by universities, public agencies, employer associations, firms, and R&D institutes. A comparable public agency-initiated network is described by Korfer and Latniak (1994) for promoting innovation amongst firms in the Ruhr region of Germany. Arrangements such as those suggested are by no means unthinkable: indeed Danish associationism is remarkably similar to this across a wide variety of policy fields (Amin and Thomas, 1996) .
Thus, the systemic dimension of innovation at regional level relies upon a combination of a well-endowed organisational infrastructure and an associative superstructure composed of an embedded civil society capable of activating social capital. Institutionally speaking, embeddedness will reside in the collective social order which evolves according to an informal microconstitution composed of microregulatory conventions, habits, routines, and rules of the game. Systemic innovation is facilitated by the constructive interaction of the institutional order and the organisational infrastructure. In this way, the augmenting of individual, firm, organisational, and institutional knowledge of consequence to innovation can be achieved and the evolutionary 'creative forgetting' of redundant knowledge can be effected (Johnson, 1992) . In table 5 we seek to outline the cultural superstructures associated with strong and weak potential for systemic regional innovation. Once again, these characteristics should be seen as poles of a continuum along which regions may evolve over time, moving towards the left-hand side of the schema as systemic-innovation potential strengthens. Where both sets of strong characteristics coincide evolutionists would see this as a strong selection mechanism, attracting ambitious enterprise. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have sought to contribute to two possibly fruitful new developments in regional research. First, and foremost, we have attempted to make the case that regional systems of innovation are a worthy focus for study and that that focus may both extend and reinforce research and theory building initiated by researchers who have done important work on the study of national innovation systems. We have argued that certain complexities, ambiguities, and lacunae of a conceptual and methodological nature may be lessened by bringing to the analytical field illuminating insights that have been captured in research which we call new regional science. Second and also importantly, in reviewing the two literatures in question, we sought to map out theoretical and research elements that might encourage the development of an evolutionary economic approach to the study of processes of regional development. Much of the progress of new regional science can be traced to new or renewed interests in the role of regions in a globalising economic landscape and to the study of geographic proximity as a source of external economies of scale and scope more generally. Explicit in this has been a growing concern to understand the role of institutions and organisations in coping with transaction costs and learning imperatives by realising gains from high-trust relationships. We have reviewed and analysed the concepts of embeddedness and disembeddedness in that context.
We then moved to a detailed consideration of the processes and conditions that characterise the infrastructural and superstructural frameworks for the specification of strong RSIs, and the barriers hindering the achievement of that status (see also Todtling and Sedlacek, 1997) . Drawing upon stylised accounts of strong and weak NISs to some extent, we itemised key elements of the organisational infrastructure both in its hard forms of financial mechanisms and communication networks and in its soft forms equating to the regional knowledge infrastructure. We balanced this by a further analysis of the cultural superstructure of norms, routines, conventions, and rules of the gamethe institutional setting-and cultural predispositions of firms and policy spheres-the organisational setting-for strong and weak RSI potential.
We conclude that RSIs in which firms and other organisations are systematically engaged in interactive learning through an institutional milieu characterised by embeddedness, have the strongest potential to warrant that designation. We further conclude that most regions do not yet have the necessary institutional and organisational characteristics fully to justify the status of RSI, but that by means of evolutionary processes many may already possess key elements for that status. Given the challenge and agreed importance of innovation to overall economic performance, those that have yet to become RSIs will face pressure in future to secure the means to hasten their regional evolution toward systemic innovation, both in institutional and in organisational terms.
